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The Order for setting up a Working Group on Portugal 
was adopted at the 25th Annual Session of the North 
Atlantic Assembly which was held in Ottawa, Canada, from 
22nd to 27nd October, 1979. In this Order the Secretary 
General was instructed • to take all appropriate steps in 
collaboration with the Economic Committee to set up 
a working group of parliamentarians and experts from 
national administrations and international organisations 
which should define concrete conclusions and measures 
in order to help Portugal in its overall economic and social 
development •. 
The Working Group was set up by the North Atlantic 
Assembly in view of the Important role Portugal plays in 
the Alliance and the problems this country was faced with 
on Its way to democracy, as well as other international 
factors which created severe economic problems. The role 
of the Working Group was to define the problems faced by 
Portugal and to recommend measures to be taken by 
members of the Alliance to alleviate these problems. The 
aim was to improve the preparations for the transition of 
Portugal into the European family by producing a thorough 
analysis of the economic situation and Portugal 's essential 
needs in the near future. 
The Working Group was composed of 8 members of the 
Assembly, an additional two members representing the 
Sub-Committee on the Southern Region of the Political 
Committee, 1 O Portuguese experts, 1 expert from the 
European Community 's General Direction of External Rela-
tions and 1 expert from the Economic Directorate of NATO, 
as well as the Director of the Economic Committee of the 
International Secretariat. 
The group held its first meeting in Porto on 19th to 
20th March, 1980. The first day was devoted to a tour of 
Aveiro, where the group was briefed on the prospects and 
plans concerning the modernisation of the town's important 
commercial and fishing harbour, and to Vila da Feira, where 
the group was briefed on the region's urgent water supply 
and sewage system problems. On 20th March the group 
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met to discuss Portugal's economic problems and the 
possible measures to be taken to improve the situation, 
especially in the following sectors : 
- agriculture ; 
- infrastructure and transport ; 
- Industry and industrial development ; 
- energy; 
- financial aspects ; 
- defence-related economic assistance. 
This first meeting was to be considered as a fact and 
opinion finding exercise. 
At the meeting of the Economic Committee in Luxem-
bourg on 6th to 7th June, 1980 the Working Group's Chair-
man and Mr. Lobato, the co-ordinator of the Portuguese 
experts, presented an interim report. 
The second meeting of the group took place in Lisbon 
on 20th to 21st October, 1980. On the first day the group 
visited a farming unit where the members received brief-
ings on the agricultural policy and the recent trends in 
Portugal's land reform. The next briefing took place at 
Sines, a new industrial area based on harbour facilities 
and refineries, where the President of the Gabinete de 
Area de Sines explained the whole project. On the tour 
through the different parts of the area the respective 
directors provided the members with further details. The 
meeting on the second day was held at the Gulbenkian 
Foundation where Mr. Lobato, the co-ordinator of the Por-
tuguese experts, gave a general introduction which was 
followed by comments from the experts who presented 
papers dealing with the different sectors of Portugal's 
economy. This was followed by a general debate. 
In addition to the meetings of the Working Group, the 
Chairman and the Economic Directorate of the International 
Secretariat were in contact with numerous experts and 
organisations concerned with this matter. 
It cannot be the function of this report of the Working 
Group to produce a scientific paper or a complete study 
on Portugal's political and economic situation and outlook. 
Neither should it be considered as an intervention in 
domestic affairs of a sovereign member country of the 
Alliance. This report should be considered as an information 
document for the members of the North Atlantic Assembly, 
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other parliamentarians and government officials of the 
Alliance countries, and for international organisations which 
are interested in helping Portugal to overcome its economic 
problems and to strengthen the country for the important 
role it plays in the Alliance. 
Mr. Robert LAUCOURNET 
Chairman 




I. The country's role in the West. 
Portugal was one of the founder members of the Atlantic 
Alliance. The vital importance of Portugal's geo-strategic 
position adequately warranted its admission to the Alliance 
even at a time when its internal situation was characterised 
by a dictatorial and absolutist system of government which 
set it apart from the democratic Western systems. The 
country was able to topple the dictatorship and made great 
efforts to become a member of the group of democratic 
nations which have joined together in the All iance for their 
collective defence. 
In view of recent developments there is a further need 
to strengthen NATO's Southern Flank, Portugal holds a key 
place in these efforts. The importance of this country to 
the Atlantic Alliance lies mainly in its strategic position. 
The American air base at Lajes in the Azores enables the 
Alliance to monitor the movements of Soviet ships, sub-
marines and aircraft over a large area of the Atlantic . 
In the 1973 Middle East war the Azores was used as a 
vital stopping-over point by American aircraft carrying 
military supplies to Israel. In addition, it provides the 
American armed forces with a vital support base for rein-
forcing its numbers in Europe. A new agreement between 
the American and Portuguese governments concerning the 
use of this base by America was signed in 1979. The 
Portuguese mainland is the base for the IBERCLANT All ied 
Command, which enables the Alliance to monitor air and 
sea surveillance of the area between the entrance to the 
Mediterranean and the Bay of Biscay. In addition, Portugal 
itself offers a logistical base for the reinforcement of 
Alliance forces, with the advantage of possessing stocks 
of fuel and shipyards capable of repa iring war ships. 
Especially in view of recent developments, there is a 
need to further strengthen the defence of NATO's Southern 
Flank. The Mediterranean member countries are the least 
prosperous of the Alliance and are unable to afford on 
their own the costs of their defence burden. Given the 
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close relationship between economic and political stability 
and Portugal's capability to fulfil its defence commitments, 
NATO should take an active interest in its general economic 
development. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty is 
commonly interpreted as an obligation of the more pros-
perous member countries to provide economic assistance 
to those members who are in need and thus, to promote 
conditions of stability for the benefit of the Alliance as 
a whole. 
On 28th March, 1977, on behalf of the government of the 
Portuguese Republic, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Mario 
Soares, submitted to the President of the Council of the 
European Community Portugal's application to accede to 
the European Community. At its meeting on 5th April, 1977 
the Council agreed to initiate the procedure provided for 
in the Treaties. At present, one of the main aims of Portu-
guese foreign policy is to bring about integration in the 
European Community. Portugal's candidature for member-
ship to the Community is backed by all the major political 
parties, with the exception of the Communist party. 
It was basically political motivations which led Portugal 
to apply for membership and it was for these reasons that 
the Community accepted Portugal 's candidature, even 
though the development gap between Portugal and the 
Community and the other candidate countries (Spain and 
Greece) constitutes a serious barrier to integration. The 
motives can really be summed up in six points : 
1. Integration into the Community should be a guarantee 
for the development of democracy in Portugal. 
2. Integration will bring about the strengthening of Por-
tugal's ties with the West. 
3. Portugal is already Integrated into the European 
economic area to a large extent, but at present it has very 
little means of making its influence felt on the Community's 
decisions. About 55 % of Portugal's exports go to the 
Community, which in turn supplies 45 % of Portugal's 
imports. More than 1 million Portuguese currently reside 
in the Community countries, and more than 900,000 of them 
live In France. Moreover, the Portuguese economy is very 
largely dependent on foreign technology and capital. 
4. Without a doubt, the enlargement of the Community 
towards the South will mean that it will have to pay much 
more attention than in the past to the economic problems 
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of the countries of Southern Europe and to help these 
countries close the development gap between them and 
the Ten. In April, 1978 the Commission of the European 
Community published its «overall considerations as regards 
enlargement problems • . With regard to Portugal , it says 
• Portugal , whose per capita income is very much lower 
than that of any other State of the enlarged Community, 
and whose structures are still not very developed, could 
stand to benefit from Community aid which would help 
to facilitate its growth. Since 1974, the Community has 
made a considerable contribution to the financial aid 
granted to this State. Within the framework of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, in particular, it should continue 
with its support for the Portuguese balance of payments and 
facilitate the development of the necessary investments, 
notably by granting loans from the EIB. After accession, it 
would most likely be appropriate to continue with the 
special aid to encourage growth in Portugal • . It is thus 
important that the Community should take all possible 
action to ensure that this support is provided. 
5. Portugal 's accession to the Community should lead to 
the free movement of Portuguese workers within the 
enlarged European Community. It is difficult to assess what 
impact this will have on migratory patterns. In the first 
place, hundreds and thousands of Portuguese already living 
in the European Community will stand to benefit from 
additional rights and increased protection. 
6. Finally, the political parties see membership of the 
Community as a means of boosting attempts to modernise 
the economy. The need to modernise the economy exists 
in any case, but integration into the Community should 
speed up this process, since Portugal w ill certainly receive 
net payments from the Community's agricultural, regional 
and social funds. These funds are used to finance projects 
aimed at improving the regional and agricultural structures. 
Despite the internal crises of the European Community 
regarding the Community Budget and agriculture which led 
to speculation that some governments want to postpone 
the planned entry into the Community, Portugal still expects 
to become a full member of the European Community in 
1983. The difficult internal discussions which will now take 
place in the European Community about the restructuring 
of its budget should not be used as an excuse for delaying 
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Portugal's accession. Due to the overwhelming political and 
security interests, the Alliance countries should use their 
influence to open the door to European Integration to 
Portugal. 
11 . Economic development. 
With a private consumption per capita of US$ 1,500 (1979 
figure) Portugal is, after Turkey, the poorest country of 
the OECD area. The income per capita is less than 50 % 
of that of Spain and about 70 % of GNP has to be spent on 
consumer goods. In the decade preceding the oil cris is 
and the 1974-75 world recession, Portugal was one of the 
countries with the most favourable growth performance. 
The April 1974 Revolution not only coinc ided with the above-
mentioned events, but also w ith the loss of the African 
colonies. These combined factors caused far-reaching 
changes in the political , social and economic life. 
When the Revolution took place in April 1974 and deco-
lonisation took priority in Portuguese politics, the country 
was already suffering from the sharp increase of about 
400 % in the price of oil. Due to this fact, the balance of 
trade deficit doubled in comparison with the previous year 
to an amount of about USS 2 billion. The following years 
were characterised by an accumulation of negative factors 
such as decreasing export figures due to lower productivity, 
increasing import figures due to inflationary wage increases 
and growing consumer demand . Due to the political in-
stability of the country, revenue from tourism also 
decreased and even the foreign currency transfer from 
migrant workers declined as a result of decreasing con-
fidence in the Portuguese currency. The climax of current 
account deficits of US$ 1.3 billion and US$ 1.5 billion was 
reached in 1976 and 1977. 
Due to relative political and economic stability, the 
negative trends of the previous years changed for the better 
in 1978 and 1979. Export figures doubled to an amount of 
US$ 3.6 billion in 1979 and reached US$ 4.6 billion in 1980, 
revenue from tourism reached a level of almost US$ 0.85 bil-
lion in 1980, remittances from migrant workers increased to 
USS 2.5 billion in 1979 and a considerable amount of foreign 
capital came into the Portuguese economy. Improvements 
in external economic relations effected positive trends In 
the national economy. Due to the repatriation of citizens 
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from Angola and Mozambique in the post-colonial era, 
Portugal was confronted with the very serious socio-
economic problem of a high unemployment rate . The relative 
statistics are extremely heterogeneous. It must be remem-
bered that the recent period was considerably affected 
by two factors. According to estimates, half a million 
people, i.e. about 6 % of the resident population in 1974, 
were repatriates from the former colonies. Demobilisation 
reduced the numbers of the armed forces from 230,000 at 
the beginning of 1974 to less than 70,000 at the end of 
1978. Unemployment figures differ very much among the 
different economic sectors and social groups. The unem-
ployment rate of people under 30 is permanently twice as 
high as the overall average. In 1980, 7.8 % of the civilian 
labour force were unemployed which shows a slight im-
provement compared with 82 % in 1979. 
The policy of price control and the slowing down in the 
depreciation of the escudo appear to have succeeded in 
reducing the average rate of inflation from 23.9 % in 1979 
(1974-1979 average 23 % ) to 16.6 % in 1980. 
The economic growth in real terms in 1980 (4.7 % ) was 
somewhat higher than in the two previous years (4.1 % 
and 3.2 %) . After annual growth rates of about 7 % from 
1960 to 1973 it sank to 1 % in the year of the Revolution 
and GNP fell to minus 4.3 % in 1975. Then, in 1976 and 1977 
growth rates increased again to about 6 % . According to 
the latest OECD analysis • private consumption could slow 
down in 1981 because of a smaller increase in household 's 
real disposable income. The target of zero real wage growth 
may be approached more closely than last year as a result 
of the weaker trend in economic activity ... Real growth of 
migrants' remittances in 1981 should be less than in 1980, 
given the generally expected slowdown in wages in Euro-
pean countries •. 
In an international context, figures for Portugal's eco-
nomic growth seem to be relatively optimistic. But one 
has to take into consideration that there is a great gap in 
the standard of living in Portugal and that of other European 
countries . 
All efforts to narrow the gap are endangered by the 
effects of the oil price increase. This development threatens 
to upset the stability which has been obtained through 
major sacrifices. Portugal obtains 89 % of its energy 
requirements through imports. Only 11 % can be covered 
by domestic sources such as hydro-electric power plants. 
15 
The remaining 83 % from oil and 6 % from coal have to be 
Imported. Even the energy consumption per capita is only 
one third of the OECD average and the oil bill in 1979 was 
equivalent to 7.5 % of the GNP. Due to the fact that Portugal 
is building up its industrial capacities and improving the 
standard of living, its energy requirement is likely to in-
crease, which will bring about a deterioration in the balance 
of payments. 
Because of its economic structure, Portugal is extremely 
vulnerable to any change in the international economic 
situation. About 60 % of its exports are from those sectors 
regarded as sensitive or which are going through a period 
of crisis in Europe - textiles, clothing, shoes, agricultural 
products. Moreover, Portugal has very few natural re-
sources and energy sources. In addition, its production 
structure is very much dependent on other countries for 
intermediary products for industrial production. It is also 
very dependent from the point of view of agriculture: 
although Portugal has been considered as an agrarian coun-
try, approximately half of the food and agricultural products 
consumed in Portugal must be imported. 
111. Defence-related industrial economic assistance. 
Defence-related industrial economic assistance has been 
little explored so far but it has considerable scope: the 
implementation of a joint and co-ordinated Allied pro-
gramme to help the less prosperous members to help 
themselves by supporting and developing their defence 
industries and thus enabling them to make better use of 
their own potential. Such a programme, however, does not 
yet exist but, in the case of Portugal, many interesting and 
mutually advantageous opportunities appear. 
At a DPC (Defence Planning Committee) meeting at 
ministerial level in December, 1978 in Brussels, the Portu-
guese Minister of Defence invited Allied nations to parti-
cipate in the stimulation of the industrial capacity of 
Portugal's defence sector. He offered the utilisation of 
Portugal as a second strategic front and pointed out that 
Its very favourable position for logistical purposes could 
become of great importance to the Alliance in times of 
crisis. In such conditions, the production of ammunition and 
certain military equipment, as well as the availability of 
maintenance and repair facilities In a safe backward posi-
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tion, would represent a considerable asset for the Alliance. 
The basis for all this is available, but a lot more needs 
to be built on top of this, and it needs to be built now! 
Once a crisis has developed, it is always too late. 
In Portugal, a considerable capacity exists for the pro-
duction of a wide range of ammunition and small arms 
used by NATO forces. The arms industry, however, needs 
revitalisation and modernisation as up to the mid-70's 
the output of the defence industry was solely orientated 
towards the requirements of the Portuguese forces in their 
armed conflicts in the Portuguese overseas territories . 
Since the decolonisation and the end of the African Bush 
Wars, the Portuguese defence Industry is in a structural 
crisis and a reorientation is necessary as the current 
demand of the Portuguese forces is barely sufficient to 
keep the vital parts of the production capacity employed. 
If the capacity of the Portuguese defence industry is to be 
kept alive, new markets for Portuguese defence products 
are urgently required within other Allied countries. 
The Portuguese economy and defence establishment, 
however, does not have sufficient financial resources 
and/or research facilities to develop independently a com-
petitive range of military products for use in Allied armed 
forces. Therefore, technological updating and infusion of 
know-how is required. This could be part of an Alliance-wide 
demand policy designed to make better use of Portugal 's 
strategic logistic advantages. Indeed, a precedent for such 
a policy exists and the creation of the existing Portguese 
armaments industry dates back to the early 1950s when 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States 
placed large orders for ammunition in Portugal. The volume 
and the time-frame of these orders enabled the Portuguese 
to build up the necessary industrial base, purchase the 
required machinery and train their manpower accord ingly. 
As a result of this policy, a modern industry for the 
production of ammunition and small arms had been created 
in Portugal by the second half of the 1950s. 
In order to bridge the technological gap which has 
developed between the present production capability of the 
Portuguese armaments industries and the requirements of 
the Allied forces, a similar policy should be considered. 
The Portuguese companies with the necessary production 
facilities and capacities still exist and the manpower is 
qualified and well-trained. The Portuguese authorities, 
therefore, believe that, subject to technological assistance 
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and transfer of know-how, their armaments industry is 
capable of meeting Allied requirements and specifications. 
There is, however, a problem concerning the acquisition 
of the necessary machinery for the production of the new 
types of arms and ammunition. Most of that equipment 
would have to be purchased from abroad which, in view 
of scarce financial resources and foreign exchange re-
serves, may present a difficult task for the Portuguese 
authorities. The latter, therefore, suggest that, if need be, 
some of the imported machinery could be paid for in 
finished products, i.e. the interested industrialised Allied 
country would supply Portugal with the necessary know-how 
and machines for the production of certain types of ammu-
nition and Portugal would pay for this machinery and know-
how in terms of the ammunition produced in Portugal. Such 
a form of co-operation between countries is not new. In the 
civilian field, barter and compensation trade are frequently 
applied between Allied and Warsaw Pact countries. 
It is no secret that at present, war reserve stocks in 
European member countries are dangerously low. As a 
result of recent developments in the Middle East and South-
West Asia , the replenishment of these stocks, including 
munitions of all kinds, is given a high priority by national 
defence planners. Subject to the awareness and willingness 
of national authorities, parts of this increased demand 
could be channelled to Portugal. Sufficiently large orders 
would enable the Portuguese to modernise their munitions 
industry and thus provide NATO with modern production 
facilities in safe backward positions without, however, 
being too far away from the potential area of armed conflict. 
Of course, such co-operation in the munitions field should 
only be a first step and interesting possibilities appear in 
other areas such as naval and aircraft overhaul facilities. 
From the above, it becomes clear that defence-related 
industrial-economic assistance could come in various forms 
but always with the same function of filling the gap that 
exists between straightforward military end item aid and 
financial economic assistance. Economic and financial 
assistance through the OECD, the World Bank, etc. cannot 
be made available for defence purposes and direct military 
assistance is quite insufficient to bring about the necessary 
results. Defence-related industrial-economic assistance 
would help Portugal, as well as the other less prosperous 
member countries, to make better use of their own industrial 
defence capabilities and thus strengthen their defence 
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position, whilst contributing to the industrial and techno-
logical development of the civilian sector. 
The proposition to extend more defence-related economic 
assistance under the auspices of NATO which, as the com-
petent authority In this field, would serve as the con-
sultative forum and co-ordinating body, was part of the 
Secretary General's report to Foreign Ministers at their 
meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in December, 
1979. The final communique that followed this meeting 
stated that the Ministers considered the report as a sound 
basis for action. Since then, however, the International 
Secretariat of NATO has not yet been given the mandate 
to follow up the Secretary General's proposals and the 
response from the industrialised member countries in this 
respect has been very weak. 
Th is lack of political will to implement defence-related 
industrial-economic assistance in a joint and co-ordinated 
way is mainly due to national armaments interests and also 
to the fact that any large scale effort would entail a certain 
financial risk. But the security risk of doing nothing should 
by far outweigh any possible financial risk. Of course, 
bilateral efforts are made here and there, but in order to 
achieve a lasting success a joint and institutionalised effort 
would be required. 
To sum up, it should be noted that a stimulation of the 
Portuguese defence industry would be of considerable 
benefit to the Portuguese economy as a whole and con-
tribute to the alleviation of the continued serious unemploy-
ment situation. It would also considerably Improve some 
problems of NATO logistics, particularly in times of crisis 
and, last but not least, it would have a favourable psycho-
logical effect and enhance the solidarity of the NATO 
Alliance. 
IV. Infrastructure and transport. 
Portugal is divided into 2 areas : internal and coastal 
(where the highest density of population is concentrated, 
mainly to the north of Lisbon). The social and economic 
integration of these two areas is an important national 
problem. The main axis is from the North to the South 
(Braga - Oporto - Averio - Coimbra - Lisbon) and it is from 
this axis that other connections to the interior of the 
country and to other countries should be made. Along the 
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coast there are harbours for international connections and 
fishing ports. However, the most important means of 
transport is still the railway. 
The railway is a heritage of the 19th century and it needs 
modernisation. Railway modernisation started in the 60's 
and 70's. Studies have shown that some of the railroads 
should be closed since roads are sufficient for the needs 
of transport. A big investment has been made to Improve 
the railway between Lisbon and Oporto but International 
railways deteriorated during the 70 's and they need to be 
modernised. In addition, it is necessary to develop the 
rolling mechanisms for the transport of merchandise and 
the acquisition of more specialised material (e .g. to support 
the cold storage system and for the transport of cereals. 
chemical and industrial products, etc.) . A serious problem 
is the surplus of railway employees. In 1972 there were 
24,000 and, according to studies then made, it was neces-
sary to reduce that number in the following ten years to 
15,000. As this did not happen, about 30,000 people are now 
working for the railway which explains its deficit. 
In the 40's and 50's the roads were improved to meet the 
needs of the existing traffic but now the main axes are not 
sufficient for the intensity of traffic . Roads are narrow 
and are not built to bear the weight of heavy traffic. As 
Portugal is a relatively small country and as the railway 
does not meet the needs of heavy traffic, the latter mainly 
use the roads . It is, therefore , of the utmost necessity to 
draw up a plan for the total modernisation of Infrastructures 
and the building of new roads to solve the problems of 
traffic from the North and the South and from the interior 
to the coast. This network system of roads should be 
built on the lines of the European standard road system. 
It will also be necessary to have a system of secondary 
roads : municipal and country roads. This network of 
secondary roads has already been planned and established 
but a big investment is needed for it to be carried out. 
For the moment, the first priority should be to improve the 
North-South axis of the country (from the border with 
Spain to Faro) in accordance with the European standards. 
Between Lisbon and Oporto and other important neighbour-
ing towns, motorways are needed (a few kilometres have 
already been constructed near Lisbon). In the North there 
Is a very important diagonal axis which needs to be rebuilt : 
Oporto - Vila Real - Bragarn;a, as well as Its connecting 
roads. In the Centre there is a diagonal road to the interior 
20 
and Spain which needs to be improved. In the South, in the 
Tagus valley, a new road has to be built from Lisbon to 
Santarem, Abrantes and Castelo Branco. To complete this 
network of diagonal roads another should be built from 
Bragan,;:a to Guarda and Castelo Branco. 
In Portugal there are three main harbours : Le ixoes (North), 
Lisbon (Centre) and Portimao (South) ; smaller harbours 
with a commercial and fishing interest : Viana do Castelo, 
Aveiro and Setubal ; a certain number of small fishing 
ports and the harbour of Sines (essentially for oil) which is 
still in a developing phase. Work needs to be carried out 
on the harbour of Leixoes to protect the external walls and 
to extend the internal docks as it Is a highly profitable 
harbour. Three million cantos have been invested in the 
Lisbon harbour to increase the depth of some quays. 
1Portugal's main airport is situated in Lisbon and its run-
ways need to be extended. For this. vacant land Is needed 
and, as this is not easily available around the actual site of 
the airport, plans for a new airport to be located on the 
south bank of the Tagus, at about 25 kms from Lisbon, have 
already been made. The international airport of Faro Is 
mainly of touristic interest. Plans have also been made to 
increase the size of the airport of Oporto, the interest of 
which is both tourlstic and industrial , but a great deal of 
investment has to be made. It would also be necessary to 
develop the network of small aerodromes in the interior of 
the country. 
The problem of the navigation of the Douro is a point for 
lively discussion in Portugal. It should be considered as a 
heritage of the 19th century when transport from the 
interior to the coast was difficult and the rivers were the 
only rapid means of communication. With the development 
of the railway and roads the role of the rivers as a means 
of transport has greatly decreased, mainly when the amount 
of merchandise and the short distance (In the case of the 
Douro - 200 kms) have not justified their use. 
The development of the north-eastern part of the country 
is of the utmost urgency and should consist of : 
- reconstruction of the railway with two main ob-
jectives : the service of the area and the transport of 
products to the areas of Aveiro and Viana do Castelo 
and as an international connection through the north 
of Spain; 
- construction of a road from Oporto to Bragan,;:a as a 
basic means of transport ; 
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- the reconversion of the railway would also be im-
portant for the transport of iron-ore from the mines 
of Moncorvo to the steel mills of Seixal. Two trains 
carrying 1,000 tons each par day would be enough to 
solve the problem of supplying the steel mills of 
Seixal. 
V. Agriculture. 
Over the last 20 years the agricultural sector of the 
underdeveloped Portuguese economy has declined yet 
further from its originally poor position. The Gross Agri-
cultural Product grew at an annual average rate of 1 % 
between 1960 and 1975, falling into minus growth between 
1970 and 1977. The 1976 GAP at constant prices was lower 
than its 1973 level. Agriculture employs one third of the 
working population, but accounts for only 12 % of GNP. 
Agricultural productivity stands at only 32 % of that of the 
other sectors of the economy, resulting in an inability to 
satisfy growing domestic demand and a steadily worsening 
general outlook. Between 1970 and 1976, the annual growth 
rate of agricultural imports was 27.6 % , with non-agri-
cultural imports rising at 21.3 % a year. 
The slackening of Portugal's economic development has 
led to an overloaded agricultural workforce, far in excess 
of the number who could draw an acceptable income from 
the generally poor, hilly and stony ground. In the northern 
regions, this intense demographic concentration has led 
to the parcelling out of land, hillside farming, and sub-
sistence agriculture. In the south, the less favourable 
conditions have combined with the system of land owner-
ship to produce widespread dependence on cork, cereals 
and rough grazing. 
The picture is not, of course, uniform. There are 
exceptions : a more advanced agriculture has developed 
in the Taje plain, where production of tomatoes, melons, 
corn, sunflowers and maize regularly reaches European 
levels ; the great wine-producing regions (Vinhos Verdes, 
Oporto, Dao, Bairrada, Oeste, Ribatejo, and a few lesser 
regions of the Alentejo and Algarve) ; the orchard areas 
of Minho, Tras-os-Montes, Beiras, Estramadura and the 
Algarve ; and the small, early fruit and vegetable area of 
the Algarve, etc. The otherwise poverty-stricken central 
region has benefited from an intense reafforestation prog-
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ramme which has stimulated a major forestry industry. 
The fact remains, however, that the overall structure of the 
agricultural sector is seriously deficient, and the vocational 
training of farmers and labourers is hampered by the high 
level of illiteracy. 
Of the 800,000 agricultural holdings in Portugal, only 
500,000 are larger than 1 ha, of which 64 % are less than 
4 ha in size, and 95 % are under 20 ha. Throughout the 
European Community as a whole, over 50 % of agricultural 
holdings are between 5 and 50 ha, with the overall ma-
jority of farms being over-parcelled and served by an 
inadequate road system. The immediate objectives, there-
fore, are a land development programme, combined w ith 
intensive action to reparcel the landholdings and improve 
the rural road system. Agricultural holdings in the south 
tend to be both too large and poorly organised. The Agrarian 
Reform programme has produced no positive results, being 
little more than a vehicle which has enabled the Communist 
Party to gain control of a large area of the Alentejo. Most 
of the soil is fit only for forestry, with approximately 30 % 
being suitable for agricultural use. 
The level of capital investment in Portuguese farms is 
very low compared to EEC levels, as the figures for tractor 
and combine harvester ownership, use of fertilizers and 
graded seeds, and the breeds of cattle reared , show. It is 
also reflected in the low levels of productivity achieved. 
The individualistic attitudes of the Portuguese farmer 
have resulted in virtually non-existent market structures. 
There is almost no market system for large-scale concen-
tration and redistribution of agricultural produce. A market 
network along the lines of the French National Interest 
Markets (Marches d'lnteret National Franc;:ais) would be 
invaluable for Portugal, as would be a cold storage system, 
and a network of cattle markets and slaughterhouses. Cold 
storage plants located at the principal ports and airports 
would also boost exports of fruit, vegetables, early produce, 
live plants and other horticultural products. The agricultural 
processing industry is both underdeveloped and based on 
outdated technology. The only industries which can be 
considered as based on appropriate technology are the 
tomato industry, brewing, some undertakings in the wine 
sector, milling, rice husking, and animal foodstuff pro-
duction. Sugar may be an agricultural growth industry 
throughout the rest of Europe, but Portugal has no sugar 
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industry whatsoever. The distillries, which the energy crisis 
will be pushing to the forefront, leave much to be desired. 
Modernisation of the agricultural sector is Portugal's 
main stumbling block, which justifies a substantial aid 
effort on the part of the member countries of the Alliance. 
But such aid must go beyond purely financial aid, however 
substantial, to include technical assistance in the formula-
tion and execution of investment projects. Ad hoe Joint 
groups of Portuguese and foreign technicians could be 
established. Each member country of the Alliance could 
sponsor one or more projects by way of financial or 
technical support. 
With this in mind, we have drawn up a list of proposed 
projects which could be usefully supported by a programme 
of aid for the economic and social development of the 
Portuguese agricultural sector : 
1. A technico-financial feasibility study on the possibility 
of increasing the area under irrigation and upgrading 
existing irrigated zones using large- or small-scale dams. 
2. Establishment of specific crop-dedicated Irrigation net-
works accompanied by domestic production of equipment : 
sprinklers, pipes, attachments etc. 
3. Implementation of a soil improvement scheme for the 
South, using ten teams of heavy earth-moving equipment 
to condition the soi l to enable counter-slope or contour 
terraced farming to be carried out, prevent water percola-
tion and combat soil erosion. Using « Rooters • or • Rip-
pers " to improve the arable layer, improving either drain-
age or water reserves. 
4. Implantation of grain sorghum and sugar-beet crops. 
5. A development plan for dried fruits with good market 
potential ; also chestnuts , walnuts, hazelnuts and almonds. 
6. Development aid for the olive-growing sector for the 
production of olives for the preserving industry. 
7. A reafforestation scheme for infertile soils of no 
agricultural value. 
Marketing and industrialisation Infrastructures: 
1. Installation of two sugar-beet refineries. 
2. Establishment of a central fruit and vegetable market 
at Lisbon. 
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3. Installation of a distillery associated to a sugar re-
finery to produce ethyl alcohol (for fuel). 
4. Construction of a chain of slaughterhouses. 
Pilot projects : 
1. Global action to modernise Portuguese agriculture at 
local level (e.g. parishes) in selected areas of each of the 
7 main agricultural regions. 
The pilot projects would Include : 
- land Improvement In the target zone according to the 
differentiation of urban and rural zones. Classifica-
tion of existing holdings into • full-time • and • part-
time •; 
- enlargement and reparcelling of small holdings with 
a view to profitability; 
- definition of • models • adapted to the ecological 
potential , the farmer 's own aptitudes and market 
potential ; 
- a concentration of the means of action favouring 
conversion : 
- dissemination of technical knowledge ; 
- credit; 
- help with the establishment of Infrastructures for 
the marketing, treatment and processing of agri-
cultural products ; 
- vocational training programmes ; 
- Installation of basic sanitary Infrastructures at 
local level (water supply and drainage) ; 
- support for the rebuilding of farmhouses to rea-
sonable habitation standards, respecting the tra-
ditions of regional domestic architecture with the 
aim of harmonious Integration with the Portuguese 
countryside. 
2. One member country of the Alliance could support the 
projects In each of the 7 agricultural regions, participating 
in the management of the project In co-operation with Por-
tuguese technicians. Execution of the projects would be 
the responsibility of the regional agricultural services 
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supported by the Central Office of the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Fisheries. 
3. Development of the Dao wine-producing region, which 
produces one of the best wines with a registered designa-
tion of origin : modernisation of the vineyards, selective 
planting of vine varieties, organisation of producer groups 
concerned with production and marketing of wine, develop-
ment of a quality control system. 
VI. Industry and industrial development. 
For Portugal , the years since 1974 - the start of the 
crisis which hit the world economy - have also been a 
time for more profound changes than that experienced by 
any other OECD country. The world-wide recession and the 
low-growth phase that followed, completely altered the 
external situation and internally Portugal underwent a 
number of radical changes - a sudden and large Increase 
in population, the loss of preferential markets, a big change 
in the supply and cost of production factors, not to mention 
the transformation which has taken place in the political 
system In labour relations and the transfer of decision-
making powers which was a consequence of the nationali-
sation of many enterprises. 
It is obvious that a country such as Portugal, which Is 
so greatly dependent on foreign trade for food and energy. 
for example. and whose purchasing power is only equivalent 
to that of a nation of three million average European 
consumers , has to open its economy to the outside world . 
The aim for Portuguese industry is to obtain a certain level 
so that it will become competitive in the European and 
world markets. The present situation shows that Portugal 
is still far from reaching this goal. The production per caoita 
is little over one third of the average for European OECD 
countries, and the sectorial structure is very unbalanced 
with predomination of sectors with less promising pros-
pects and frequently with inadequately-sized companies. 
The overall productivity is estimated at one quarter to 
one third of that of most European countries. The structure 
of production costs shows, in many cases, striking Im-
balances which affect International competitivity, and fre-
quently lead to prices that are higher than those of other 
European countries on the international market. In many 
cases, the given capacity is used inadequately and. due to 
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the insufficient infrastructures, industry is also faced with 
problems. The rate of growth prior to 1973 was always 
regarded as being insufficient in view of the low level at 
which it started and due to the fact that it did not allow 
for the Portuguese industry to catch up with the average for 
the European OECD countries in time. From 1974 onwards, 
owing to the very slow development, the gap has become 
more marked. There is no doubt that the relative lag has 
been aggravated, even when compared with the lowest 
levels of European development. The social and political 
consequences of the polarisation of such a situation are 
too serious for Portugal and the Alliance to regard them 
with impassivity. 
Even if Portugal does have a relatively large agrarian 
sector, Industrial development is a fundamental condition 
for the country's development as a whole . Industrial deve-
lopment will have a marked motor effect, both upstream 
and downstream. The most urgent problems the country 
is faced with are the raising of the industrial per capita 
production in order to reduce as quickly as possible the 
lag in relation to other European countries and the elimina-
tion of unemployment and under-employment. 
One has to take into consideration the fact that Portu-
guese industry has comparative advantages. The country 
possesses natural resources, it has a relatively well-skilled 
and not too costly labour force and it is geographically 
well-situated being next to the big European markets and, 
through its harbour facilities, to overseas markets as well. 
If these advantages and the existing industries are to form 
the nucleus of industrial expansion in Portugal , it is neces-
sary to have the right strategy for industrial development. 
It is of national responsibility and of great importance to 
work on a clearly defined industrial policy to be pursued 
for the next 4 to 5 years, involving, amongst others, the 
following aspects : 
- definition of the main medium-term objectives ; 
- defin ition of the position of the state and of the 
private initiative ; 
- co-ordination between industrial policy and planning ; 
- technological research policy ; 
- foreign investment policy. 
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Obviously, such a coherent development strategy has to 
be developed with regard to the future Integration of 
Portugal into the European Community. 
A concrete project which demonstrates Portugal's efforts 
to develop the industrial basis of the country is the urban 
and industrial complex at Sines which was designed in 
1971. Now, ten years later. the Sines project is beginning 
to work. The main aim is the creation of a pool of develop-
ment In the South of Portugal to attract Sines industries 
and to counteract the concentration of industries in the 
Lisbon and Oporto regions. Its installation in this particular 
region was essentially determined by the choice of Sines 
for the construction of a large deep-water port. During the 
period of construction this industrial area underwent delays 
and changes due to the oil crisis and the economic and 
financial difficulties which were experienced by Portugal, 
particularly between 1974 and 1977, as a result of internal 
political changes and decolonisation, which accelerated the 
negative effects resulting from the international economic 
situation. 
Over USS 2 billion have already been invested in this 
development project which is the largest ever launched 
in Portugal. Sines is already having a strong Impact on the 
South of Portugal, a traditionally backward region which 
has only recently been integrated into the country's deve-
lopment process. In 1971 the population of the Sines area 
was 16,000, whereas now there are over 30,000 inhabitants, 
in this • new city• and 10.000 more are expected to be 
living there by 1982. 
But this very ambitious Industrial project requires further 
investment which cannot be covered exclusively by national 
funds. The oil terminal at Sines Is. for the moment. finished 
and more Investment is not necessary. But there is a project 
of • oil storage capacity • under consideration which will 
cost USS 10 million. This project had been initially en-
visaged for transhipment purposes. but now it can increase 
the strategic value of Sines by storing oil imported from 
the Middle East. The • ore and cargo terminals • project 
has already reached the stage of study and design. The 
construction phase will probably begin at the end of 1981, 
so that it will be ready to receive coal for the electric 
power plant in 1984. The minimum cost of this project is 
estimated at USS 150 million. The • pipe-line • project has 
been discussed for a long time. This project Is not com-
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mercially viable from a national Portuguese point of view 
but has to be evaluated even beyond economical arguments 
which also include other parameters such as the security 
and diversification of supply for other Alliance countries. 
The internal road and rail networks have, to a large 
extent, been designed and built. But the connections 
between this system and the national system must be 
developed in order to increase the accessibility to the 
hinterland. The estimated cost of the construction of roads 
for this purpose is about USS 7 million, to be spent between 
1981 and 1984. The railways, which will be necessary due 
to the estimated increase in traffic, will cost about USS 
30 million. A central marshalling yard is now under con-
struction and for its completion an investment of USS 3 mil-
lion Is needed. 
The development of the Sines project depends, too, on 
other sectors such as housing and infrastructures. In order 
to complete the first phase of an urban centre it Is neces-
sary to build some 2,000 dwellings with accompanying 
social and public facilities , such as schools, a new hospital 
etc. 
The investment programme of the Sines area was finan-
cially covered from 1971 to 1980 by the national budget 
(36 % ). internal credit (39 % ) and external credit (25 % ) . 
Due to the present monetary policy, which limits the 
expansion of domestic credit, during the current year, 
50 % of this Investment programme has been financed by 
external credit, mostly from the Euro-dollar market. The 
financing of the above-mentioned projects from 1981 to 
1984, from institutional sources would be a very important 
contribution to the development of the Sines project. 
But it is not only for the development of the industrial 
area of Sines that Portugal needs external support. 
According to preliminary studies carried out in 1977-1978 
with the aim of gradually eliminating the existing gap 
between Portugal and OECD countries, the amount of in-
vestment required for the state-owned industrial companies 
was in the order of about USS 3 million for the 1981-1984 
phase. Investments which are expected from the private 
sector are not yet available. Therefore, the Central Depart-
ment for Planning's priority should be to present a global 
analysis. 
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VI I. Conclusions. 
Obviously, it is not easy to develop proposals and new 
initiatives in order to improve Portugal's economic situation 
so that the country will be in a position to play its important 
role as a European country and an active member of the 
Western Alliance in an era of world-wide economic and 
financial difficulties. All the individual nations in the West 
are faced with severe economic problems such as high 
inflation rates, unemployment, balance of payments prob-
lems. increasing competition on international markets etc. 
A country like Portugal is even more affected by these 
negative trends in two respects. Firstly, the gap between 
the economic levels of Portugal and most of the other 
member countries of the Alliance is considerable and, 
secondly, Portugal has the great intention to very soon 
become a full member of the European Community, a com-
munity to which some of the strongest and most advanced 
economies belong. 
Portugal 's own financial and economic strength is quite 
insufficient to implement a substantial and prolonged 
development and structural change programme which is a 
pre-condition for sustained and balanced growth. Conse-
quently, Portugal will continue to rely on foreign assistance. 
It has to be expressed very clearly that this assistance is 
in the interest of Portugal, in order to further improve her 
social and political stabibility so that she may thus assume 
full responsibility in the Alliance, and in the interest of the 
Alliance. 
It has to be mentioned that Portugal has already received 
considerable external assistance in the past and that im-
portant aid programmes are being carried out. To consider 
all these numerous bilateral and multilateral programmes 
and to examine them with a view to their economic effec-
tiveness would go far beyond the scope and the purposes 
of this report. However, the most important donor Institu-
tions for technical and financial help are the World Bank 
with a credit of more than US$ 500 million, the European 
Community with approximately 275 million Units of Ac-
count. the EFTA Development Fund with approximately 
3 billion Escudos. as well as the OECD and the United 
Nations Development Programme. Apart from this , coun-
tries like the United States, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom have contrib-
uted to Portugal's development measures. 
30 
This International assistance has obviously affected 
Portugal 's economy in a positive way. Undoubtedly, Portu-
gal has made progress in achieving economic and political 
stability. But in view of the deep-rooted medium-term 
problems, continued efforts from the more prosperous 
countries are required in order to increase assistance and 
to reinforce the newly-found confidence so that the country 
can be spared from further serious economic disruption. 
An examination of the sectoral and structural difficulties 
of the country shows that financial assistance alone is 
insufficient. We think that new approaches are necessary, 
both on the part of donor countries and in Portugal 's 
economic structure. The provision of technical assistance 
should play an important role in the aid programmes. The 
sectors of transport, communication systems and public 
administration would suit th is kind of aid, in particular. 
Despite great potential , Portugal's major problem con-
tinues to be low level of productivity, especially In the 
agricultural sector. Due to this , the country is still a large 
net importer of foodstuffs which , together with energy 
imports, is the main reason for the continued current 
account deficit. Foodstuff imports account for 20 % of the 
deficit and in order to improve this difficult situation in the 
agricultural sector, financial aid has to be supplemented by 
a training system for farmers and farm workers. In this 
field many member countries of the European Community 
and the Alliance have much experience wh ich should be 
transmitted. As a result of an institutionalised education 
system for farmers, following experiences in the industrial 
sector, productivity in the agricultural sector Increased at 
a very high rate in almost all European countries. Such a 
system of specialised schools should be established in 
Portugal to be supplemented by a network of advisory ser-
vices which should also be set up to help young farmers. 
Effective incentives for the acceptance of such a system 
could be created by giving financial support only to those 
farmers participating successfully In this course of In-
struction and who have reached a certain level. 
But there seems also to be an urgent need for training 
facilities for skilled workers in the industrial sector, too. 
This area presents a wide field for concrete co-operation 
with foreign donors, both on a state level and on a private 
basis. In fact, more emphasis should be put on co-operation 
and assistance for concrete projects. These kind of projects 
should be developed and set up jointly by domestic and 
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foreign experts to avoid purely prestigious and less pro-
mising projects. Such close co-operation often leads to 
very efficient long-term co-operation to the benefit of both 
partners. On the donor countries ' side, a common, but 
co-ordinated, approach is of greater efficiency. Co-ordina-
tion should mean that individual donor countries provide 
assistance to Portugal in those areas in which they have 
special experience and in which they are Interested in 
closer co-operation. For example, there are member coun-
tries of the Alliance which have special experience In the 
fishing Industry and cou ld help to modernise the Portuguese 
fishing fleet. Others like some Mediterranean countries, 
should concentrate on the agricultural sector, etc. In order 
to implement such co-operation, the setting-up of bilateral 
commissions for the planning and real isation of concrete 
projects would be very useful. On each side these com-
missions should consist of representatives of government 
departments involved, as well as representatives of private 
firms which are interested in co-operation with Portuguese 
partners. 
Another way to help Portugal Is to encourage private 
industry to intensify relationships, both through further 
Investments and through joint projects. Here, it Is the 
responsibility of the Portuguese authorities to reduce 
bureaucratic obstacles and to create a tax system with 
appropriate incentives - in short, to make Portugal 
attractive for international direct investment. The member 
countries of the Alliance and the European Community can 
contribute to an improving economic environment by 
bringing their influence to bear on international organisa-
tions for further support and by doing everything possible 
to bring about fair and quick negotiations in preparation 
for accession. Portugal 's accession to the European Com-
munity should not be a matter of political or economic 
tactics. The political importance of Portugal's membership 
in the Community is more convincing than most of the 
narrow-minded economic arguments. 
In the case of Turkey, the Alliance has demonstrated Its 
capability for united action. Even If the economic, social 
and political difficulties of Portugal are, fortunately, less 
alarming, we should not only continue, but increase our 
efforts for united assistance. To show and to declare our 
solidarity with Portugal is also a psychological factor, which 
should not be under-estimated, to strengthen t ies within 
the Alliance as a whole. 
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If this report contributes to making politicians, both in 
parliaments and governments, more aware of Portugal's 
urgent need of assistance from its partners and that an 
economically, socially and politically strengthened Portugal 
is also In the best Interest of the North Atlantic Alliance, 
a great deal of our task will have been accomplished. 
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Statistical annex 
TABLE I Labour force and employment. 
TABLE II Unemployment. 
TABLE Ill Immigration. 
TABLE IV Origin of gross domestic product at factor cost. 
TABLE V Agricultural production. 
TABLE VI Foreign trade by product group. 
TABLE VII Geographical breakdown of foreign trade. 
TABLE VIII Breakdown by nationality of foreign visitors. 
TABLE IX Breakdown of total energy requirements . 
TABLE X Investment programme in the electrical energy 
sector. 
TABLE XI Investment programme of public companies (1980-
1984). 
TABLE XII Foreign direct investment. 
34 
Total population 
Civilian labour force 











Source : INE. 
TABLE I 
Labour force and employment 
Percentage change 
Thousands 1978 1979 
1980 II 1977 1978 
9 423 0.4 1.4 
4 303 0.3 2.2 
« .7 45.0 
3 955 -0.3 2.1 
1.082 -5.4 -0.2 
1 071 5.0 2.3 
372 4 .9 3.4 
1 430 -0.6 3.9 
2 665 1.5 2.0 
224 -1 .2 -6.8 
961 4.8 2.4 
333 5.8 1.4 
1 147 -1 .6 4.2 
TABLE II 
Unemployment (I) 

















As a percentage 










8.2 8.2 7.8 
5.5 4.9 4.1 
12.1 13.0 13.0 
16.2 15.9 14.6 
As a percentage 
of the number of unemployed 
First Job seekers 49.8 56.3 




TAB LE Ill 
Immigration 
Legal I/legs/ Total 
% % % 
1974 43 397 61.8 26 876 38.2 70 273 100.0 
1975 24 811 55.2 20 107 44.8 44 918 100.0 
1976 17 493 52.6 15 753 47.4 33 246 100.0 
1977 17 226 59.4 11 763 40.6 28 989 100.0 
1978 18 651 76.3 5 802 23.7 24 453 100.0 
1979 20 622 84.4 3 818 15.6 24 400 100.0 
Total 142 200 62.8 84 119 37.2 226 319 100.0 
Source : Centre for Planning Studies. 
TABLE IV 
Orig in of gross domestic product at factor cost 
(Million escudos) 
Agricul ture. forestry and fishing 
Mining and quarrying . 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water 
Construction 
Transport and communications 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Banking, Insurance and real estate 
Ownership of dwellings 
Public administration and defence 
Other services 
Gross domestic product et factor 
cost 
Source: National Statist ics Institute. 
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342 138 422 634 
71 949 90 539 126 300 
3 788 4 735 6 500 
200 084 256 292 339 200 
15 114 21 409 27 300 
36 222 45 640 52 500 
36 702 45 224 
70 190 86 506 
37 083 46 598 53 OOO 
92 703 118 434 
563 834 715 376 920 OOO 
TABLE V 
Agricultural production 
Uni t j 1914 I t!T15 I 1916 j 1977 I t!T18 j 1979 
Cereal production 
Wheat 100 tons 5 336 6 012 6 857 2 243 2 SOO 2 327 
Rye, barley and oats 100 tons 3 164 3 525 4 083 2 016 2 310 2 151 
Maize 100 tons 4 655 4 513 3 785 4 419 4490 4 560 
Rice 100 tons 1 295 1 327 972 1 017 1 350 1 350 
Potatoes and veget-
ables 
Potatoes . 100 tons 11145 10 129 9181 12 006 11 280 10116 
Broad beans, French 
beans, chick-peas 100 tons 809 802 726 637 761 667 
Wine 1 OOO hi 13 873 6 783 9 253 6 587 6 362 11 498 
Ollve oll 1 OOO hi 526 539 392 327 438 557 
Cattle alaughtared 
Homed cattle 








175 963 197 891 183 945 186 534 219 731 201 286 
84 n2 92 069 79 021 n 110 89 819 91 499 
13 446 13 337 12 049 10 253 12 708 11 675 
n 745 92 485 92 075 101111 111204 98 112 
242 517 236 154 239 211 229 643 204 410 200 245 
Sources: Annual Reports of the Bank of Portugal; Natlonal Statistics Institute. Food 
and Agricultural Statistics. 
TABLE VI 
Foreign h'ade by product group 
Percentage change over corresponding period 
Total Imports 





Farm and food products. 
Wood and cork . 
Textile, clothing and foot-
wear 
Machinery and transport equip-
ment . 
Memorandum ltam : 
Exchange rate of escudo 























• Exclusive of ships and planes. 



































Ceagr.aphic.al breakdown of foreign trade 
(Billion escudos) 
I 1973 I 1974 I 1975 I 1976 I ,m I 197s I 1979 
Experts 
Total 45.4 58.0 49.3 55.1 77.7 106.4 176.1 
OECD countries • 35.8 45.8 39.3 44.2 61.4 88.2 142.6 
OECD Europe 29.5 38.0 34.4 38.9 54.0 75.5 127.1 
Germany 3 .4 4.6 5.0 5 .9 9.2 14.0 21.6 
France 2.3 3.4 3.3 4 .6 6.2 9.6 17.1 
Italy 1.4 1.9 1.6 2.1 2.9 6.1 10.4 
United Kingdom 10.8 13.2 10.5 10.2 14.2 19.4 31.4 
Other OECD European 
countries 11.5 14.7 14.0 16.1 21.6 26.5 46.6 
United States 4.4 5.8 3.6 3.7 5.2 7.5 10.8 
Other OECD countries. 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.6 2.1 3.1 4.2 
Non-OECD countries 9.6 12.2 10.0 10.9 16.3 20.3 33.5 
Including : OPEC 0.3 0.4 0 .9 1.0 1.4 1.5 3.4 
Previous Escudo 
area 6.7 6.4 4.2 2.7 5.0 5.9 
lmp0rts 
Total 74.8 118.1 99.5 130.9 190.7 230.1 331.9 
OECD countries• 57.3 85.1 69.3 93.9 138.7 177.4 243.3 
OECD Europe 47.2 69.0 53.0 75.5 109.9 138.7 188.6 
Germany 10.8 15.9 11.0 15.2 23.7 31.9 41.8 
France 5.2 9.2 7.5 10.9 15.4 20.7 28.4 
Italy 3.9 6.3 4.9 6.1 10.2 12.6 17.1 
United Kingdom 8.5 10.9 8.7 12.2 19.8 23.2 30.7 
Other OECD European 
countries 18.8 26.8 20.8 31.0 40.7 50.2 70.6 
United States 6.1 11.1 12.3 12.9 19.4 27.1 39.0 
Other OECD countries. 4.0 4.9 4.0 5.5 9.4 11.5 15.7 
Non-OECD countries 17.5 33.0 30.2 37.0 52.0 52.7 88.7 
Including : OPEC 2.7 7.7 11.6 15.2 20.6 27.1 47.9 
Previous Escudo 
area 7.4 12.4 5.1 3.3 2.5 1.5 
• Including New Zealand since 1975. 
Source: National Statistics Institute. 
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TABLE VIII 
Breakdown by nationality of foreign visitors 
Thousands 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Total 4 079.7 2 621 .8 1 966.4 2 17S.4 3 055.4 3 389.3 5 287.4 
Germany 209.7 167.2 143.8 1S0.1 204.2 259.3 286.7 
Argentina 26.8 22.4 11 .9 10.6 12.1 13.4 
Belgium 46.3 30.4 27.2 32.1 S0.7 46.9 48.2 
Brazil 65.2 52.7 43.7 35.5 45.0 52.1 
Canada 25.0 38.8 22.8 21.7 32.0 36.9 40.7 
Spain 2 109.3 1169.4 856.4 1 049.3 1 599.5 1 755.2 3 514.8 
United States . 345.7 217.6 96.1 82.1 141.5 161 .5 153.8 
France 248.6 152.9 119.1 134.4 172.4 179.6 183.2 
Netherlands 54.1 37.4 39.5 51.6 92.3 111.1 129.8 
Italy 80.0 83.7 69.8 66.6 65.4 72.4 70.1 
United Kingdom 511.6 383.0 284.6 244.6 292.8 3279 399.8 
Sweden 42.8 31.6 27.3 49.2 61.0 56.3 S1.4 
Switzerland so.a 38.5 23.0 23.2 32.8 31 .7 36.0 
Other countries 356.7 179.3 181.7 214.9 264.7 293.4 307.4 
Source : National Statistics lnstlrute, Tourism Statistics . 
TABLE IX 
Breakdown of total energy requ irements 
1961 1970 1973 1978 
Total energy requ I rements (MTOEJ 3.47 6.15 7.60 9.56 
of which : % 
Solid fuels 21.6 12.8 7.8 S.2 
011 49.0 64.4 70.S 68.7 
Hydro-electric and geothermal 29.4 22.8 21 .8 26.0 
Source: lntematlonal Energy Agency. 
(Total energy requirements era defined as domestic production. plus Imports, less 
exports, leas marine bunkers, leas the Increase In stocks .) 
39 
TABLE X 
Investment programme in the electrical energy sector 
(Main production centres) 
(Current 
Put In Investment prices, Situation Characteristic service (1980 lncludlng prices} general costs 
end Interests) 
to• 10• 101 100 
kus us, ficus us, 
Alqueva Hydro-electric 
3 X 130 MW 1988/ 89 13.6 272 31.3 626 
Alto Llndoso Hydro-electric 
7SOMW 1985/ 86 12.1 242 29.4 588 
Torrao Hydro-electric 
1'40 MW 1985 3.3 66 6.5 130 
Sines Coal 
(2nd ph) 2 X 300 MW 1986/ 87 28.3 566 64.1 1.282 
Rio Malor Llgulte 
100 to 150 MW 1986 7.6 152 16.7 334 
Matos lnhos Gas turbines 
2 X 104 MW 1983/64 2.6 52 4.4 88 
Source : Electrlcldade de Portugal • 
TABLE XI 
Investment programme of public companies ( 1980-1984) 












1984 I Total 1981-1984 ment In 1980 1981 
820.0 5 465.5 
34 893.7 29 680.1 
26 400.0 33 375.0 
31 329.1 30 761 .4 








2 793.9 7'40.5 17 751 .5 
32 427.3 13 553.5 105 742.2 
43 125.0 42 625.0 160 625.0 
31 103.2 27 284.7 118 554.0 
781.5 435.2 6 996.0 











Total 195 527.4 1 102 286.9 112 512.0 I 110 230.91::::1 "°9 668.7 1-::--:::-
Source: Mlnlst6rlo des Finances e do Piano. 
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TABLE XII 
foNign diNCt investment 
( in million US dollar) 
1971 1978 1979 
Ve/ue % Velue % Vslue % 
United States 16 28.0 7 11 .3 10 10.9 
Canada 1 1.8 2 3.2 0 0 
OECO Europe 38 66.6 51 82.3 74 60.4 
EEC 21 36.7 31 50.0 36 41.3 
United Kingdom 4 7.0 3 4.8 4 4.3 
Germany 5 8.8 7 11.3 9 9.8 
France 7 12.3 7 11.3 19 20.7 
EFTA 17 29.6 18 29.0 33 35.9 
Switzerland 17 29.8 17 27.4 26 28.3 
Other OECD countrl as 0 0 0 0 3 3.2 
Japan 1.8 0 0 1 I. I 
Other countries 1.8 2 3.2 1 7.6 
Tot a I 57 100.0 62 100.0 92 100.0 
(million eac.J (2160) (2 772) (4492) 
Source : Bank of Portugal . 
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